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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW[
instead from that order to the court of appeals on questions of law and fact.
The court of appeals held that the order of the trial court directing the
plaintiff to answer the questions in the course of the deposition was not a
"final order," reviewable on appeal, the obvious remedy being an appeal
from a contempt citation which would follow the plaintiff's refusal to con-
form with the order of the common pleas court.
In an opinion by the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County in the case
of Grosset v. Armet Alloys, Inc.,10 the Court again reviewed the rule upon
abuse of discretion by a trial curt in granting a motion for new trial, and
held that error of law does not, per se, constitute an abuse of discretion, no
evidence of prejudice appearing in the record.
CLARE D. RUSSELL
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Real Party In Interest and Amendment of
"Cause of Action"
One of the most troublesome problems in the law of pleading and pro-
cedure is the basic one of "what constitutes a cause of action?" Where does
it begin, where does it end, and what are its essential and minimal elements?
Nowhere is this more difficult of solution than in the situation caused when
a plaintiff seeks to amend his petition or to substitute parties after the run-
ning of the applicable statute of limitations.
Ohio courts have been extremely liberal in permitting amendments and
substituting parties. In the past, the supreme court has held' that when a
widow institutes an action as administratrix for damages for the wrongful
death of her husband, under the mistaken belief that she has been appointed
and qualified as such administratrix, and after the running of the statute of
limitations on the action discovers her want of qualification, she may com-
10 113 N.E.2nd 391 (Ohio App. 1953).
An excellent article entitled "How to Get wto the Supreme Court," by Judge
Kingsley A. Taft, was published in December, 1953, in Volume 26, No. 47, of THE
OHIO BAR.
A new article on appellate review, which indicates outstanding research and
which contains a discussion of the procedural statutes recently amended, appears in
Volumes 2, 3, and 4 of OHIO JURISPRUDENCE (2d ed.), just released.
Judge Roscoe G. Hornbeck and Harold F. Adams, of the Columbus Bar, have
also recently published a compact and informative book called "Appellate Practice in
Ohio." (Columbus, Ohio, The John Adams Publishing Co., 1953, pp. 155, $4.50.)
The book outlines steps taken in perfecting appeals from the various courts, both in
civil and criminal cases, discusses such matters as the elements of a final order and
what constitutes a chancery case, and includes a number of citations which should
prove helpful to the practitioner. This work, however, is limited to appeals from
courts and does not cover appeals from commissions and administrative agencies.
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plete her qualification and amend her petition. The amended petition will
relate back to the date of her original petition, and the action will be deemed
to have been commenced within the tune limited by statute.
In Kyes v. Pa. R.R.,2 the supreme court was faced with a situation in
which the action for wrongful death had been brought within the time
limited -by the statute by an ancillary administrator, appointed by the pro-
bate court of an Ohio county, of the estate of a non-resident. When the
capacity of the ancillary administrator was challenged, his appointment was
vacated by the probate court, and the decedent's mother was appointed ad-
ministratrix in Pennsylvania -after the running of the statute. The trial
court in which the wrongful death action was pending allowed her to be
substituted as the party plaintiff.
The supreme court denied the defendant's contention that the two cases
ought to be distinguished on the grounds that in the later case there had
been no honest intent and mistake, or that there was a substitution of an
entirely different person acting in a different capacity, under authority of a
different sovereignty, and that there was knowledge of the lack of capacity.
No supreme court opinion has ever yet overruled the case of Tetdner v.
Rankn,3 in which it was held that a plaintiff acting wholly without au-
thority as executor or administrator could cure such a defect in capacity by a
subsequent appointment.4
The court in the Keyes case relied upon the unchanged character of the
cause of action in wrongful death, the nominal character of the statutory
plaintiff's interest and the requirement ' of liberal construction of the
remedial part of the Code.6
Accrual of Cause of Action: Principal v. Agent
A situation is frequently presented in which, although a breach of
duty has occurred, the person to whom the duty is owed either is honestly
ignorant of it or has no reasonable means of determining at the time of
breach the total extent of his damages. While prospective or future dam-
ages in personal injury actions are, theoretically, capable of definite ascer-
tainment, there are numerous other situations which pose greater difficul-
'Douglas v. Daniels Brothers Coal Co., 135 Ohio St. 641, 22 N.E.2d 195 (1939).
2 158 Ohio St. 362, 109 N.E.2d 503 (1952).
126 Ohio St. 522 (1875).
4 See Douglas v. Daniels, 62 Ohio App. 22 N.E.2d 1003 (1938)
'Omo REv. CODE § 1.11 (Omio GEN. CODE § 10214)
The case is interesting also from the standpoint of the court's decision that the trial
court's delay of four years and three months in ruling on defendant's motion for a
new trial did not deprive the court of jurisdiction. See OHio REV. CODE S 2701.02
(OHio GEN. CODE § 1685).
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ties. In Archer v. Huntngton Nat. Bank,7 plaintiffs employed the defen-
dant bank as agent to sell certain securities owned by the plaintiffs and apply
the proceeds toward liquidation of a loan to the plaintiffs. The bank sold
most of the securities so entrusted, but allegedly neglected to sell or to at-
tempt to sell a certain large block of securities on March 4, 1937, and did
not do so until November 6, 1950, on a low market. The difference in the
sale price on the respective dates cost the plaintiff-borrower over $22,000.00.
The defendant bank demurred generally, which demurrer the court sustained
on the ground that the right of action accrued on March 4, 1937, and that
since more than four years had elapsed before action brought, it was barred
by the statute of limitations8 applicable to tort actions.9
The court of appeals, distinguishing State ex rel Lfen v. House,'0 held
that the transaction in the case before it was not an express trust, that the
cause of action accrued and the statute of limitations began to run when the
alleged negligent act was committed, and that the damage is not the
cause of action.""
There is not much doubt that there is case authority in support of the
court's conclusion on the issue of when the cause of action accrues.' 2 How-
ever, the condusion is utterly unrealistic. No amount of violations of a duty
owed to another will give rise to a cause of action until the obligee of the
duty has suffered injury or damage. Until the injury has been suffered, how
can the damages, in fairness even to the violator of the duty, be computed?
Nor ought we need to wait until the legislature acts to change the statutes,
as has often been suggested. Some day a courageous court is going to adopt
a realistic view of the problem and correct the law on it.
Service of Process: Non-resident Motorists
Ever since the right of a state was established'3 to require of a non-resi-
dent motorist that he submit to service of process in actions brought in
the state into which he drives, arising out of his being there, a constant ex-
pansion of the concept of amenability to process has been the rule. In
Paduchik v. Mikoff," the Supreme Court of Ohio logically extended the
'92 Ohio App. 229, 109 N.E.2d 677 (1952)
8OHio REv. CODE S 2305.09 (OHIo GEN. CODE § 11224)
'How this result could possibly have been reached under any proper appplication
of the code rules on demurrers defies understanding. See OHIO REV. CODE 5
2309.08, 2309.09 (OHIo GEN. CODE 5§ 11309, 11310)
" 144 Ohio St. 238, 58 N.E.2d 675 (1944).
'Archer v. Huntington Nat. Bank, 92 Ohio App. 229, 232, 109 N.E.2d 677, 678
(1952).
'Williams v. Pomeroy Coal Co., 37 Ohio St. 583 (1882); Kerns v. Schoonmaker,
4 Ohio 331 (1831).
"Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 47 Sup. Ct. 632 (1927).
" 158 Ohio St. 533, 110 N.E.2d 562 (1953)
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scope of the statute 5 I which constitutes the secretary of state the agent to
receive service of process in Ohio on the non-resident motorist to a situation
in which the accident took place not on a public highway, but on private
property. The plaintiff was injured by an automobile in the driveway of a
farm building where the defendant was working. The court held that the
statute was not, as are those of some other states, restricted in its terms to
accidents occurring on the highways, and that there was no legislative or con-
stitutional reason so to restrict it. The result is entirely logical and is in
line with a growing nufiber of decisions which base amenability to process
not on consent which the state has a right to refuse, but upon the doing of
an act within the jurisdiction.' 6
Joinder of Actions for Pain and Suffering
and Wrongful Death
In many instances of wrongful death, the victim incurs more or less pain
and suffering prior to death. It is well established that the tortfeasor may
be held liable in damages for both aspects of his tort, and while the proceeds
of each recovery often ultimately reach the same heirs of the decedent, they
do so by entirely different channels, since the pain and suffering recovery
accrues to the estate and the wrongful death recovery to the widow, children,
heirs, and next of kin having a pecuniary interest in the life of the decedent.
Traditionally most lawyers have joined the two causes of action in one peti-
tion to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to have the rights of all parties
fully determined in one action. The supreme court put an end to this
practice in Fielder v. Ohio Edison Co.", Its reasoning was that both causes
of action do not affect all the parties to the action as required by Ohio Re-
vised Code Section 2309.06 (Ohio General Code Section 11307)
Declaratory Judgments: Jurisdiction of Courts
Since its enactment,' 8 there has been a slowly but steadily growing use
of the Declaratory Judgments Act. 9 In Zanesille v. Zanesville Canal &
Mfg. Co.,2 the supreme court.reversed a common pleas decision which had
" OHio REV. CODE 5 2703.20 (OHo GEn. CODE S 6308-1).
" See Sugg v. Hendrix, 142 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1944)
"T 158 Ohio St. 375, 109 N.E.2d 855 (1952),'5 WEsT. REs. L REV. 109 (1953).
Of course, it being a misjoinder of causes of action, defendant could. waive the defect.
For an interesting situation arising out of such a waiver, See LoPresti v. Community
Tfaction Co., 160"Ohio-S. 480 (1954).'
"P115 Ohio- aws495" (1933).
" OHo REv. CODE S5 2721.02 thrm 2721.15 (OHIo GEN. CODE 5 12102-1 thru
12102-16).; -.- . -- .. I t.
"159 Ohio St. 203, 111 N.E.2d 922 (1953). "
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been affirmed by the court of appeals, in favor of the plaintiff, the City of
Zanesville. The action had been brought to determine the right of the
plaintiff to put certain real property in its possession and "appropriated"
(actually, "dedicated") in 1802 to one public use, to a new and different
use. At the time of the original dedication the laws of the Northwest Terri-
tory vested the fee of lands dedicated by town plats to public use in the
county. The plaintiff joined as defendants just about every possible de-
fendant except the county.
The supreme court, following numerous precedents in other states, held
that the Declaratory Judgments Act is applicable only where there is a pres-
ent, actual controversy, and only where justiciable issues were presented and
all mnterested persons are made partes to the proceeding. The repeal of the
former dedication act in 1831,21 of course, did not divest Muskingum
County of the fee. A vitally interested party was not brought before the
court, which is in declaratory judgment actions a jurisdictional fact, going
to the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Jurisdiction of Common Pleas Courts:
Replevin Against Personal Representative
In last year's survey, 22 criticism was leveled at a decision22 of the court
of appeals which held that the courts of common pleas had no jurisdiction
of an action in replevin against the administratrix of a decedent's estate to
recover certain personal property which the decedent held at the time of his
death as bailee for the plaintiff, and that sole jurisdiction of the action
rested in the probate court which was administering the decedents estate.
In commenting upon the court's decision, we pointed out that Lsngler v.
Wesco,24 upon which the court of appeals relied for its result, could readily
be distinguished.
The supreme court, in Servtce Transport Co. v. Matyas,2 5 reversed the
court of appeals, distinguishing Lsngler v. Wesco on another theory. It is
submitted that whatever may be the shortest path to the result reached, the
supreme court's conclusion that courts of common pleas do have jurisdiction
in such cases is a proper one. The same result was later reached by the
Court of Appeals in Cuyahoga County in Carter v. Birnbaum.26
Limitation of Actions: Set-off and Counterclaim:
Cross Demands Deemed Compensated
In Summers v. Connelly 7 the supreme court was faced with the trouble-
some problem which arises when a plaintiff's claim is met by a cross-demand
2129 Ohio Laws 350; OHIO REV. CODE 5 711.11 (OHIo GEN. CODE S 3589).
1
2 4 WFsT RES.L. REv. 205 (1953).
(Spring
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from the defendant, one of which is barred by a statute of limitations. In
this case, a husband died intestate, seized of real estate he had previously
inherited from his deceased wife. Neither left any children, both had
other heirs, and the "half-and-half" statute28 was invoked, one-half of hus-
band's interest in the realty which he had inherited from his wife passing
to the wife's heirs. Two of the wife's heirs were indebted to the husband at
the time of his death on a promissory note which had become barred by the
statute of limitations. The administrator damned that any amount due from
the husband's estate to the wifes heirs should have set off against it the
amount due from those heirs to the deceased husband, even though had the
estate sued on the note the claim would have been barred.
The supreme court declared that the statute of limitations is one of re-
pose and not a mere presumption, and that the rule that statutes of limita-
tions are not applicable to defenses has no application to cases of set-off or
counterclaim, but is confined to strict defenses. The court refused to per-
mit the administrator to set-off against the share passing to the indebted
heirs the amount of their indebtedness so barred.
Limitations of Actions: Foreign Corporations: Attachments
Plaintiff, in her quest of beauty, purchased from an Ohio drug store a
chemical compound used in making home-permanent hair waves, which was
manufactured by a foreign corporation. Plaintiff was injured in her use of
it and sued the drug store.29 The foreign corporation was not authorized to
do business in Ohio and apparently had no agents or assets within the state.
More than two years later, and after the running of the statute of limitations
on her cause of action, plaintiff learned of credits due to the foreign corpora-
tion from retailers in Ohio, and filed an amended- petition, naming the
foreign manufacturer as a new party defendant and garmsheeing its debtors
located here. Service of summons was then had upon the foreign defendant
by publication.
The question raised by the foreign corporation's special appearance and
motion to quash was whether the "saving clause" 0 in the portion of the code
dealing with limitation of actions prevented the runmng of the two-year
' Service Transport Co. v. Matyas, 63 Ohio L Abs. 236, 108 N.E.2d 854 (App.
1952).
79 Ohio St. 225, 86 N.E. 1004 (1908).
= 159 Ohio St. 300, 112 N.E.2d 20 (1953).
113 N.E.2d 102 (Ohio App. 1953).
' 159 Ohio St. 396, 112 N.E.2d 391 (1953), 5 WEST. RES. L. REv. 209 (1954).
2'OHiO REV. CODE 5 2105.10 (OH O GEN. CODE 5 10503-5).
"Moss v. Standard Drug Co., 159 Ohio St. 464, 112 N.E.2d 542 (1953).
"When a cause of action accrues against a person, if he is out of the state, or has
absconded, or conceals himself, the period of limitation for the commencement of
19541
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.statute3 of limitations on plaintiff's injury so as to allow plaintiff to.proceed
against the foreign manufacturer....
The court construed the word "person in the saving clause to apply to
corporations, as artificial persons, and ruled that the suspension prwvsons
of. such statutes are operative without regard to the character of the action
,s being one in personam, quasi-in-rem or in rem.3 2 The court left unan-
swered the question whether, the statute begins to run at the -time when
property of the foreign corporation first comes into the state subsequent to
the accrual of the cause of action, observing that." the record does not
c ontain evidence that either merchandise or accounts belonging to this de-
fendant did exist in Ohio prior to the institution of the attachment.pro-
ceedings herein involved."33 Quaere: what would the result be if the
foreign corporation could show that it had had merchandise or accounts be-
longing to it in Ohio at all times subsequent to the accrual of the cause of
action?
Statute of Limitations: Saving Clause:
Temporary Absence of Defendant From the State
The Ohio "saving clause"34 also provides that if a person, after the cause
of action accrues, departs from the state, or absconds or conceals himself, the
time of his absence or concealment shall not be computed as any part of
the period within which the action must be brought.
In Kossouth v Bear35 the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County had
occasion, for the first time in this state except for a one-line dictum in an
earlier supreme court case,36 to apply this portion of the statute, dealing
with departure of defendant after the accrual of the cause of action. The
defendant by his alleged negligence caused bodily injury to plaintiff on
May 30, 1948. Thereafter there occurred a comedy of errors in plaintiff's
efforts to obtain service up'on defendant, the details of which are not relevant
tothe solution of the court's problem, for it found as a fact that the defen-
dant continued from the date of the accident to live openly and without
the action shall not begin to run until he comes into this state or while he is so
absconded or concealed. " (Emphasis supplied) OHIO REV. CODE § 2305.15
(OHIo GEN. CODE S 11228)
3 iOHIO REV. CODE § 2305.10 (OHIo GEN. CODE § 11224-1)
" This was probably dictua, since the court correctly held that the action to be one
strictly in personam, and at least one case, Crandall v. Irwin, 139 Ohio St. 253, 39
N.E.2d 608 (1942), has held that the saving clause does not apply in an action to
foreclose a mechamc s lien.
,Moss v. Standard Drug Co., 159 Ohio St. 464, 474; 112 N.E.2d 542, 547 (1953)
iO-no REV. CODE S 235.15 (OHIO GEN. CODE § 11228)
114 N.E.2d 80 (Ohio App. 1953)..
"Title Guaranty & Surety Co. v. McAllister, 130 Ohio St. 537, ji4,.200 N.E._831,8.3,,. (1936). .. ..
[Spring
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conscious effort to conceal his-whereabouts in and about Cleveland until he
left to live in California.in August. or September of 1950. ...The applicable
statute of limitations 37 therefore ran out on May 30, 1950, unless certain
temporary absences of defendant from Ohio on pleasure trips- between
May 30, 1948, and May 30, 1950, were sufficient to toll its running. De-
fendant was served through the Secretary of State3" some time after Novem-
ber 1, 1950.
The court seems to have assumed for the 'purposes of argument that de-
fendant's temporary absences from the state between May 30, 1948, and
May 30, 1950, might have totalled up enough tme in fact to toll the granite,
if they had that legal effect. It ruled, however, that as a matter of.law they
did not have such a legal effect. Distinguishing a case in which the de-
fendant had been and to all intents and purposes had remained absent
from -the state from the time of or prior to ,the accrual of the cause of ac-
tion,s and cases in which a defendant departed from the state permanently
after the cause accrued but before the statute had. fully run, 0 the court
likened the situation to that in Stanley v. Stanley,4 in which temporary
visits to the state by a non-resident were held not to commence the running
of the statute. Temporary absences from the state by a resident do not toll
the running of the statute.
Jurisdiction to Award Non-resident Husband's
Insurance Policy to Wife in Divorce Action
A difficult question of the juirisdiction of a trial court in an uncontested
divorce action was presented to the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County
in Whtelaw v. Wht tlaw, and it was decided by a divided ourt; it is this
*rrter's opinion that the dissentiiig judge was correct in his view of the case.
Plaintiff wife sued ddfendant husband fdr divorce. -The husban'd was
not found within the jurisdicfi.6n, and contructive service was had upon
him. The plaintiff had in her possession two insurance policies issue to
the husband on his life by an insurance company. She filed a supplemental
petition stating this fact and the fact that she had been and was continuing
to pay the pr~daiums thereon; -made -the insurance company a party defen-
dant; and in addition to her prayer for divorce asked that the court award
to her all right, title and :interest -in and ..to said contrxcts, of insurance be-
,Okuo REv. CoDE 5 2305.10 (OHxo GEN. CODE §.1122471).
OIo REv. CODE S 2703.20 (OIo GEN. CODE 5 6308-i).:
'Meekison v. Groschner, 153 Ohio St. 301, 91,N.E.2d 680 (.1950-..
Couts v. Rose, 152 Ohio St. 485, 90 N.E,2d 139 -(195.0.); Commonwealth: Loan
Co. v. Firestine, 148 Ohio.St, 133,73 N.E.2d 501.(1947),
4147 Oiu St. 225,-24N.E.-49 .(1.890).-,........
" 65 Ohio L. Abs. 11, 113 N.E2d 105. (App. 1952);: . . ... "
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longing to her husband. The insurance company defended on the ground
that the court had no jurisdiction to award to plaintiff the relief prayed for
by her with respect to the insurance policies, in the absence of any personal
jurisdiction over the husband.
The common pleas court found that it did have jurisdiction to award the
husband's interest in the policies to the plaintiff wife. Upon appeal by the
insurance company the court of appeals, one judge vigorously dissenting,
reversed and entered final judgment for the insurance company. The ma-
jority of the court of appeals distinguished Benner v. Benner"3 and Reed v.
Reed,44 in which "real or personal" property was before the court, on the
basis that the policies were only evidence of the term of the contract, a mere
contract right, not a symbol of property, and because the policies each con-
tained a provision that only the insured was entitled to obtain any cash sur-
render value or exercise any other right under the policy.
The dissenting opinion relied upon the case of Cleveland & Buffalo
Transit Co. v. Beeman,45 in which it was held in an almost identical fact
situation that certificates of stock in a corporation might be allowed to the
wife as alimony and an order made upon the corporation directing it to
transfer the certificates of stock to her, and upon Pennington v. Fourth Nat.
Bank of Cincinnati,4 1 in which an absent husband's bank account was
ordered paid to plaintiff wife.
It is true that there is a factual difference between real property and
tangible personal property on the one hand and intangible personalty on the
other. But it seems to this writer that there is no material legal difference
between certificates of stock in a corporation and a policy of insurance, and
that if anything, a cash surrender value of an insurance policy is both in
fact and in the eyes of the law more tangible and susceptible of judicial
administration than is the owner's "equity" in a stock certificate. While
the problem is certainly not without difficulty, it is the opinion of this writer
that the dissent has the better argument in this difficult but highly important
case.
Service of Process: Defendant Exempt While
Attending Criminal Case in Response to Warrant for Arrest
The Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County had occasion to pass upon
the unusual problem, in In re Lorok,4 7 of the exemption of an accused in a
crimmnad proceeding from service of civil process. It has long been estab-
63 Ohio St. 220, 58 N.E. 569 (1900).
121 Ohio St. 188, 167 N.E. 684 (1929).
16 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 112, 4f'd, 81 Ohio St 509, 91 N.E. 1126 (1909).
"92 Ohio St. 517, 112 N.E. 1085, aff'd, 243 U.S. 269, 37 Sup. Ct. 282 (1917).
'93 Ohio App. 251, 114 N.E.2d 65 (1952).
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